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In 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) to rescue 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from financial collapse. HERA created the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorized it to act as both regulator and conservator of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. The statute grants broad immunities to FHFA when it is acting as 
conservator—from judicial review and from the imposition of penalties, among others. Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are now invoking these immunities in their own right, and claiming that 
they should apply to themselves as well in their roles as owners of occupied residential 
properties. This Article explores this recent development in the context of two areas of litigation 
in Massachusetts: whether the Non-Profit Buyback Law, M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C, applies to 
properties owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
are liable for multiple damages for unfair and deceptive practices under M.G.L. c. 93A. The 
Article argues that courts have erroneously interpreted HERA by immunizing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac from liability in both of these contexts. It further argues that this precedent lays a 
foundation for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to flout state consumer protection law throughout 
the nation. This result is contrary to the express statutory mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to promote low- and middle-income housing.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, Congress passed the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act (HERA) as one of several pieces of “bailout” legislation. HERA was 
intended to help stabilize the housing market by increasing governmental control over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the two primary backers of the so-called “secondary mortgage market.”2 
With the housing market on the brink of collapse, there was widespread concern that if Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac failed, so too would the rest of the country’s housing finance system. Thus, 
HERA created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and empowered it to place Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac (“the Enterprises”) into conservatorship, which it did only months after 
HERA was passed. Conservatorship is “a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled 
institution with the objective of returning [it] to normal business operations.”3 
Over the past several years, much academic debate has focused on this changed legal 
architecture surrounding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and its impact on their roles in the 
secondary mortgage market.4 This debate, while rich, has largely ignored the significant ways in 
which the new legal frameworks have also affected the rights and liabilities of the Enterprises as 
owners of residential property. Indeed, few outside the affordable housing and eviction defense 
advocacy communities are aware of the sheer volume of occupied residential housing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac have acquired in the wake of the foreclosure crisis. Under the Enterprises’ own 
business models, and pursuant to their contracts, loan servicers conduct foreclosure sales on 
mortgages backed by the Enterprises on their behalf, and must sell the properties to the 
                                                                
2  Fannie Mae is also known as the Federal National Mortgage Association.  Freddie Mac is also known as 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.  
3  Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, Sept. 7, 2008, 
https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-of-FHFA-Director-James-B--Lockhart-at-News-Conference-
Annnouncing-Conservatorship-of-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac.aspx [https://perma.cc/7M94-R6QF]. 
4  See, e.g., Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 585 (2009); 
Evan Page, Federal Housing Help Falls Short: The Housing And Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 249 (2008); David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study 
of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907 (2010); David Reiss, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie 
Conservatorship Litigation, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479 (2014).  
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Enterprises as the highest bidder unless outbid by a third party.5 In practice, because the defaulted 
mortgages in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s portfolios are often for distressed properties located 
in low-investment markets, this model means that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquire a 
substantial portion of the properties they foreclose. As of late 2014, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
owned a combined total of 121,000 foreclosed homes.6 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have therefore become, perhaps unwittingly, landlords to 
thousands of tenants across the country.7 They have also come to own many properties occupied 
by former owners who are still fighting to remain in their homes post-foreclosure.8 These 
relationships have become the subject of intense legal battles across the nation.9 The battles have 
been particularly fierce in Massachusetts, where anti-foreclosure and anti-displacement activism 
has led to strong protections for tenants and former homeowners alike.10 Among other 
protections, tenants living in foreclosed homes may not be evicted without “just cause,” and 
homeowners have the right to repurchase their homes after foreclosure through non-profit 
institutions.11 These protections are considered the gold standard of anti-foreclosure advocacy 
nationwide.12 
Faced with this landscape of robust occupancy rights, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
turned to HERA as a tool to flout the law. They have claimed that certain HERA provisions that 
insulate FHFA’s conservator actions from judicial review and statutory penalties also equivalently 
shield the actions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. With Massachusetts courts largely accepting 
their arguments, the result has been that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been insulated from 
liability under state consumer protection laws—laws often specifically enacted to protect low- and 
middle-income tenants and homeowners. 
This Article will explore the development of the expanded immunity afforded to Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae under the guise of HERA in the specific context of two areas of litigation in 
Massachusetts. First, the Article will examine Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s efforts to immunize 
themselves from the state non-profit buyback law, M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C, which prohibits banks 
that own occupied foreclosed properties from refusing to sell those properties to certain non-profit 
organizations.  Second, the Article will explore Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s efforts to insulate 
themselves from the multiple damages provisions of M.G.L. c. 93A, the state consumer law that, 
                                                                
5  See Fannie Mae Servicing Guide, “Conducting Foreclosure Proceedings” and “Issuing Bidding 
Instructions,” §§ E-3.2-09, E-3.3-04; Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide, 9301.31: Delegated Bidding. 
6  Dina ElBoghdady, Thousands of People Can Now Buy Back the Homes They Lost to Foreclosure, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 26, 2014, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/26/thousands-of-people-can-
now-buy-back-the-homes-they-lost-to-foreclosure/?utm_term=.99deb57ecde3 [https://perma.cc/6VN3-E2SU].  See 
generally Dane,et al., Discriminatory Maintenance of REO Properties as a Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 17 
CUNY L. Rev. 383 (2014) (noting “glut” of bank-owned home properties following the foreclosure crisis).  
7  See infra Sec. II(e). 
8  See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (2011); Bank of America v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613 
(2013). 
9  See Fannie Mae Servicing Guide, supra, note 5. 
10 See Boston Group Helps Homeowners ‘Stand Up, Fight Back’ Against Foreclosure, PBS NEWS HOUR, 
Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business-july-dec10-foreclosures_10-19/ [https://perma.cc/M43U-3RJA].  
11 See M.G.L. c. 186A; M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C(h). 
12 See Tony S. Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: Mitigating Harm to Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure Crisis, 
4 DEPAUL J. SOCIAL JUSTICE 2, 39-40 (“In August of 2010, Massachusetts passed the most comprehensive law in the 
country for protecting people living in foreclosed-on properties”) (internal citations omitted).   
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inter alia, protects tenants from unfair and deceptive practices of landlords. 
Through the lens of these two recent litigation trends, this Article argues that the courts’ 
expansion of immunity to the Enterprises is erroneous. The courts’ interpretation of HERA is 
based on a confused understanding of the conservatorship that conflates FHFA regulatory action, 
FHFA conservatorship action, and Enterprise action. The distinctions among these actions are 
clearly outlined in the text of HERA and have been consistently upheld in Circuit Court 
precedent. They are also well supported by the public statements of FHFA and the sworn 
testimony of Fannie Mae regarding the structure of the conservatorship. 
The result of the collapse of these distinctions is a broad expansion of the applicability of 
the HERA immunity provisions.  Whereas these provisions once applied only to concrete FHFA 
actions as conservator, they now have been held to apply to activities undertaken independently 
by the Enterprises with minimal, if any, FHFA involvement.  This precedent lays a foundation for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to flout state laws enacted to protect low-income homeowners and 
tenants nationwide. This outcome is a paradox given Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s explicit 
mission of promoting affordable housing.13 
I. HISTORY OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC AND THE CONSERVATORSHIP 
A. The Establishment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs,” or 
“Enterprises”), created under statutory charters enacted by Congress in 1938 as part of the New 
Deal and in 1970, respectively.14 The declared purposes of Congress in establishing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were, among other goals, to “provide stability in the secondary market for 
residential mortgages” and “promote access to mortgage credit. . . by increasing the liquidity of 
mortgage investments and improving the distribution of investment capital available for 
residential mortgage financing.”15 The stated goals also explicitly included promoting access to 
mortgage financing for low- and moderate-income families even where investment in such 
financing involves a “reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned on other 
activities.”16 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are referred to as government-sponsored rather than 
government-owned because both congressionally chartered enterprises were eventually converted, 
by statute, into publicly traded corporations.17 Yet, despite these structural changes, the goals of 
the Enterprises to stabilize mortgages and increase liquidity in the mortgage market remained the 
same post-privatization.18 In essence, the business model of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to 
purchase mortgages issued by commercial banks, and to repackage and sell them as “mortgage 
                                                                
13  See infra, Sec. III. 
14  See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. § § 1716-1723; Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459. 
15  12 U.S.C. § 1716(3). 
16  Id.  
17  Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F.Supp.3d 208, 215 (D.D.C. 2014). See Housing and Urban Development 
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802, 82 Stat. 536-538 (1968); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 432-433 (1989).  
18  See Avni Patel, The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 21, 22 (2008). 
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backed securities” to other investors.19 Thus, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not make loans 
directly to consumers, but rather purchase mortgages once they are already issued by commercial 
banks.20 This purchase and resale of mortgages is known as the “secondary mortgage market.” 
Because banks and other loan originators use the profits from the sales to make new loans, the 
strength of the secondary mortgage market has traditionally been viewed as critical to securing 
access to credit for consumers, as well as to ensuring the stability of the housing market as a 
whole.21 
B. The Foreclosure Crisis and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
While a complete analysis of the causes of the foreclosure crisis is beyond the scope of 
this Article, a brief discussion of the Enterprises’ role in the crisis bears mention.  Through their 
business model, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are expected to further their dual mission of 
providing financing for American home-buyers and increasing profits for shareholders.22 In 2004, 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), citing the Enterprises’ statutory 
mission of improving homeownership rates for low- and middle-income families, began explicitly 
requiring the Enterprises to purchase “affordable” loans made available to low and middle-income 
borrowers.23 In exchange, HUD allowed the Enterprises to place billions in subprime loans on 
their balance sheet.24 The Enterprises took on a combination of “Alt-A” mortgages (“Alternative-
A” mortgages, which lacked data about the borrower’s creditworthiness), “interest-only” 
mortgages (mortgages that allowed the borrower to pay down only the interest, without making 
payments on principal) and “adjustable rate” mortgages (mortgages with flexible interest rates 
that increased over time).25 In its 2007 Annual Report, Freddie Mac reported: 
The proportion of higher risk mortgage loans that were originated in the market 
during the last four years increased significantly. We have increased our 
securitization volume of non-traditional mortgage products, such as interest-
only loans and loans originated with less documentation in the last two years in 
response to the prevalence of these products within the origination market. 
Total non-traditional mortgage products, including those designated as Alt-A 
and interest-only loans, made up approximately 30% and 24% of our single-
family mortgage purchase volume in the years ended December 31, 2007 and 
2006, respectively.26 
Fannie Mae similarly reported in 2007: 
                                                                
19  Id.  
20  Id.  
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 23.  
23  Id. at 23.  
24  Id.  
25  Thomas H. Stanton, The Failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Government Support 
for the Housing Finance System, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 217, 223 (2009).  
26  Freddie Mac, 2007 Ann. Rep., at 13, http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/pdf/2007annualrpt.pdf. 
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We are experiencing high serious delinquency rates and credit losses across our 
conventional single-family mortgage credit book of business, especially for 
loans to borrowers with low credit scores and loans with high loan-to-value 
(“LTV”) ratios. In addition, in 2007 we experienced particularly rapid increases 
in serious delinquency rates and credit losses in some higher risk loan 
categories, such as Alt-A loans, adjustable-rate loans, interest-only loans, 
negative amortization loans, loans made for the purchase of condominiums and 
loans with second liens. Many of these higher risk loans were originated in 
2006 and the first half of 2007.27 
As now has been well documented, these loans were targeted to minority borrowers in 
particular, with black and Latino borrowers 2.8 and 2.3 times more likely, respectively, to receive 
high-rate subprime loans.28 
What is now known as the “foreclosure crisis” began at the end of 2006. The subprime 
loans’ high interest rates and low- and middle-income families’ inability to afford payments 
caused foreclosure rates to soar.29 From 2006-2011, the City of Boston alone experienced 4,000 
foreclosures of residential properties. Throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, more 
than 45,000 people lost their homes.30 While precise data on the number of renters versus owners 
affected by foreclosure is lacking, existing evidence suggests that as of 2008, as many as 46% of 
the affected units in Massachusetts were renter-occupied.31 
By 2008, at the height of the crisis, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together owned $5.4 
trillion of guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. The high foreclosure rates also caused major 
depreciation of home prices and resulted in substantial losses for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.32 
This, in turn, precipitated the loss of investor confidence in the Enterprises.33 The Bank of China, 
the largest Chinese holder of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities, reduced its debt held from 
$20 billion at the end of 2007 to $17.3 billion by June 30, 2008, and sold or matured $4.6 billion 
of its 2008 holdings.34 
                                                                
27  Fannie Mae, 2007 Ann. Rep., at 24, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/proxy-
statements/2007_annual_report.pdf. 
28  Jackelyn Hwang, Racialized Recovery: Post-Foreclosure Pathways in Distressed Neighborhoods in 
Boston. Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, at 24 (Feb. 2015). 
29  See Patel, supra note 18, at 24. 
30  Rebuilding the Commonwealth: Recovering from the Foreclosure Crisis and Setting the Foundation for 
Future Success, Mass. Atty. Gen., April 2014, available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2014/homecorps-
report.pdf. 
31  See Nick Hartigan, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response to the Foreclosure Crisis in 
Massachusetts, 45 HARV. CIV. R. CIV. L. L. Rev. 181, 187 (2010).   
32  Fannie Mae lost $5 billion in the second half of 2007 and another $4.5 billion through the first half of 
2008. Freddie Mac lost $3.7 billion in the second half of 2007 and $1 billion during the first half of 2008. See “Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac: Where the Taxpayer Money Went,” Fed. Hous. Finance Agency Office of Inspector General, 
WPR––2012-02 at 12 (May 24, 2012), available at https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/FannieMaeand FreddieMac-
WheretheTaxpayersMoneyWent.pdf. See also N. Eric Weiss, Cong. Research Serv., R42760, Fannie Mae's and Freddie 
Mac's Financial Status: Frequently Asked Questions (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf. 
33  See Patel, supra note 18, at 24. 
34  Id. at 24-25. 
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C. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) 
To prevent the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress passed the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) in 2008. HERA represented the first of the so-called 
“bailout” pieces of legislation that were passed or proposed as an attempt to mitigate the effects of 
the recession and housing crisis.35 HERA was passed in “[a]nticipat[ion] [of] the severe 
ramifications a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac collapse would have on the fragile housing market - 
and therefore on the U.S. economy as a whole.”36 HERA has five stated objectives: (1) supporting 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in their roles as regulators of the mortgage industry; (2) providing 
relief to lenders and borrowers; (3) stabilizing the housing market; (4) alleviating the social 
consequences of foreclosures; and (5) “preventing a future housing crisis.”37 To achieve these 
goals, the statute created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) as a new independent 
federal agency.38 The Director of the FHFA is appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.39 
Much of HERA focuses on the role of the Federal Housing Finance Agency vis-a-vis the 
Enterprises.40 Under subchapter I, the FHFA has “[g]eneral supervisory and regulatory authority” 
over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks.41 Pursuant to this 
authority, the FHFA may, through its Director, “issue any regulations, guidelines, or orders 
necessary to carry out the duties of the Director under this chapter or the authorizing statutes, and 
to ensure the purposes of this chapter and the authorizing statutes are accomplished.”42 When 
issuing regulations, the Director of the FHFA is required to give notice and provide opportunity 
for public comment pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.43 
Separate and distinct from its regulatory and supervisory authority, HERA also grants 
FHFA the power to appoint itself as conservator or receiver of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and/or 
the Federal Home Loan Banks ““for the purpose of reorganizing, rehabilitating, or winding up the 
affairs of a regulated entity.”44 While a receivership is generally established to wind down a 
company, conservatorship is typically used to return entities to a sound and solvent condition in 
which they can continue to operate.45 On September 6, 2008, following the Enterprises’ 
““unsuccessful effort to raise capital in the private markets,”,” the FHFA placed the Enterprises 
into conservatorship pursuant to this authority.46 They remain in conservatorship today. 
                                                                
35  See Arthur, supra note 4, at 586.  
36  Steele, Fannie, Freddie, and Fairness: Judicial Review of Federal Conservators, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 
417, 421 (2016).  
37  See Arthur, supra note 4, at 586.  
38  12 U.S.C. § 4511(a).  
39  12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(1). 
40  HERA was modeled largely after the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (“FIRREA"),”), passed in response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See Steele, supra note 38, at 421. 
Specifically, “HERA modeled FHFA's regulatory power over the GSEs after those granted in FIRREA to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ('FDIC') to assume control of failing banks and financial institutions.” Id.  
41  12 U.S.C. § 4511(b).   
42  12 U.S.C. § 4526(a).  
43  12 U.S.C. § 4526(b). 
44  12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2). 
45  See Reiss (2014), supra note 4, at 483. 
46  Perry Capital LLC, 70 F.Supp.3d at 216. 
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D. The Conservatorship 
As conservator, FHFA acts as a “successor” to the GSE and, by operation of law, 
“immediately succeed[s] to (i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the [GSE], and of any 
stockholder, officer, or director of such [GSE] . . .; and (ii) title to the books, records, and assets 
of any other legal custodian of [the GSE].”47 ). FHFA may then “operate” Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac by taking over its assets and performing all of its functions.48 
While FHFA initially took full control of the Enterprises when it placed them into 
conservatorship in September 2008, it promptly re-delegated to the Enterprises many of their 
essential functions, including (i) to the board of directors, the authority to oversee the Enterprises, 
and (ii) to management, the authority to conduct the Enterprises’ day-to-day operations.49 
Describing this as “the most efficient structure,” FHFA decided that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
“would continue to be responsible for [their own] normal business activities and day-to-day 
operations” under the conservatorship.50 The Director announced that,, “the focus of the 
conservatorship is not to manage every aspect of the [Enterprises’] operations.”51 Yet as 
Conservator, FHFA retained its powers under HERA to: 
“take such action as may be— 
(i) necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition; and 
(ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve  
the assets and property of the regulated entity.”52 
Relevant for the purposes of this article, HERA limits judicial review of FHFA’s actions 
as conservator, stating that “[e]xcept as provided in this section or at the request of the Director, 
no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as 
a conservator or receiver.”53 HERA also provides that FHFA, when acting as a conservator or 
receiver, ““shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of penalties or fines, including those 
                                                                
47  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A). 
48  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B).  The statute provides that as conservator FHFA may operate Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac by: 
(i) tak[ing] over the assets of and operat[ing] the regulated entity with all the powers of the 
shareholders, the directors, and the officers of the regulated entity and conduct[ing] all business of 
the regulated entity; 
(ii) collect[ing] all obligations and money due the regulated entity; 
(iii) perform[ing] all functions of the regulated entity in the name of the regulated entity which are 
consistent with *1278 the appointment as conservator or receiver; 
(iv) preserv[ing] and conserv[ing] the assets and property of the regulated entity; and 
(v) provid[ing] by contract for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, action, or duty of the 
[FHFA] as conservator or receiver. Id.  
49  FHFA-Office of the Inspector General, White Paper: FHFA OIG’s Current Assessment of FHFA’s 
Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WPR-2012-001, at 2, 12 (March 28, 2012), available at 
www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/WPR-2012-001.pdf 
50  FHFA, Annual Report to Congress 2010, at 1 (June 13, 2011), available at www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs.   
51  FHFA, Annual Report to Congress 2010, at 1 (June 13, 2011), available at www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs.   
52  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D).   
53  12 U.S.C. § 4617(f).  
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arising from the failure of any person to pay any real property, personal property, probate, or 
recording tax or any recording or filing fees when due.”54 
E. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as Owners of Occupied Residential Property 
Barely recognized or appreciated during the emergency enactment of HERA, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac by 2008 had come to own thousands of residential properties (not simply 
the loans underlying the mortgages) throughout the country, many of them occupied.55 It is 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s business models to purchase the foreclosed properties whose 
loans they have underwritten unless they are outbid by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure 
auction.56 Because many of the homes that were foreclosed during the crisis were distressed and 
located in low investment markets, outbidding was rare. Thus, at the time HERA was passed, in 
2008, Fannie Mae owned 67,500 foreclosed properties nationwide.57 That number would only 
increase in the years to come as the foreclosure crisis gained steady steam throughout the late 
2000s and early 2010s. By late 2014, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned a combined total of 
121,000 foreclosed homes.58 
There is no indication that Congress or any of the relevant agencies involved in the 
crafting of HERA gave any serious consideration to how the conservatorship would affect Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac as owners of occupied properties. Instead, the architects of the law focused 
on the traditional role of the Enterprises as mortgage financers, and on their primary purpose of 
providing liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. Specifically, Treasury Secretary Henry M. 
Paulson Jr. identified the objectives of HERA and the conservatorship as “providing stability to 
financial markets, supporting the availability of mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers.”59 He 
explained that: “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are critical to turning the corner on housing. 
Therefore, the primary mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase 
the availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure with an 
eye toward mortgage affordability.”60 The statement went on to enumerate a four-step plan to 
provide stability to the secondary mortgage market through the conservatorship.61 The statement 
made no mention whatsoever of how the conservatorship structure would bear on the Enterprises’ 
status as owners of occupied residential properties. A press release issued by FHFA Director 
James B. Lockhart on the same day similarly discussed only the Enterprises’ role in the secondary 
mortgage market, ignoring their role as property owners.62 
                                                                
54  12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). 
55  Charles Duhigg, Fannie Mae Lets Renters Stay Despite Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at B1.  
56  See Fannie Mae Servicing Guide, E-4.01-01; Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide, 9301.31: 
Delegated Bidding. See supra note 5. 
57  See Duhigg, supra, note 55.   
58  See ElBoghdady, supra, note 6.  
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id.  
62  See Statement of the Honorable James B. Lockhart III, Director Federal Housing FinanceFed. Hous. Fin. 
Agency Before the House CmteComm. on Financial ServicesFin. Servs. (Sept. 25, 2008), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media
/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-of-James-B-Lockhart-III-Director-FHFA-Before-the-US-House-Committee-on-Financial-
Services.aspx [https://perma.cc/S2G5-LFD8]. A subsequent statement issued by James B. Lockhart on September 25, 
2008 similarly discussed only the Enterprises’ roles in the secondary mortgage market and made no mention of the 
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II. THE NON-PROFIT BUYBACK LAW, M.G.L. C. 244, § 35C 
While the legislative history of HERA fails to indicate any Congressional intention to 
affect the rights and obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as owners of residential property, 
the Enterprises were quick to invoke the law in that context in an effort to shield themselves from 
state consumer protection laws with which they did not wish to comply. In the wake of the 
housing and global financial crisis, in 2012 the Massachusetts legislature enacted “An Act 
Preventing Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures.”63 The statute “extends a layer of consumer 
protection to homeowners saddled with the riskiest subprime mortgages and seeks to curb abusive 
foreclosure practices on the part of some mortgage purchasers.”64 The Act was intended both to 
prevent foreclosures and to reduce unnecessary vacancies following foreclosure.65 The provisions 
require creditors include requirements for a creditor to extend a loan modification offer to a 
borrower in certain circumstances, and to provide strict notice to requirements for borrowers 
facing foreclosure.66  The statute also authorizes, and punishments for creditors who make false 
statements in a court of law about their compliance with the statute or about the borrower’s 
payment history.67 
Most relevant here, one provision of the law expressly concerns resales of foreclosed 
properties through a model established by a local non-profit organization, Boston Community 
Capital (BCC).68 In 2009, BCC launched the Stabilizing Urban Neighborhoods (SUN) Initiative 
with the goal of revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods that had been hard hit by “underwater” 
mortgages and vacant properties.69 “Underwater” mortgages are defined as mortgages in which 
the amount owed on the mortgage exceeds the current fair market value of the property. In the 
wake of the foreclosure crisis, it was extremely common for properties to be purchased at 
foreclosure for an amount that was significantly lower than the amount the original owner owed 
on the mortgage, thus signaling that the home was underwater. BCC observed that in many 
instances, owners would be able to afford payments on a new mortgage at the current market 
value (i.e., an amount at or near the foreclosure purchase price), but were not able to access credit 
through traditional financial lending institutions to obtain one.70 They also were unable to obtain 
new mortgages from their current banks because most large financial institutions, including 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, refused to offer principal production.71  Thus, these borrowers 
would face displacement despite being able to afford their home at its current market value. 
                                                                
Enterprises as property owners.. 
63  See 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 194 (codified as Mass. G. Laws ch. 244, §§ 14, 35B- 35C (Foreclosure Law).)).  
64  See Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F.Supp.3d 94, 95-96 (D. Mass. 2014).  
65  See Final Report of the Foreclosure Impacts Task Force, Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General at 
5 (June 2014).   
66  See M.G.L. c. 244, §§ 14, 35B-35C. 
67  Id. See M.G.L. c. 244, §§ 14, 35B-35C. 
68  See M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C(h).  
69  See Mass. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 96.  
70  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s own financing rules impose a three-year waiting period for borrowers to 
qualify for a mortgage after a foreclosure. See ElBoghdady, supra, note 6.  
71  See Final Report of the Foreclosure Impacts Task Force, supra, note 68 at 9.  Principal reduction – 
reducing the amount of principal owed on a mortgage as part of a loan modification – would be a more direct mechanism 
for enhancing the affordability of mortgages and allowing borrowers the opportunity to remain in their homes. See id. See 
also ElBoghdady, supra note 6. 
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The SUN Initiative addressed this gap by creating a model in which BCC purchases 
foreclosed homes at fair market value (usually from the bank that purchased the home at 
foreclosure) and then immediately resells them to the original owner for roughly the same price, 
with only a slight mark-up to cover costs. Thus, the Initiative creates a unique opportunity for 
individuals in this situation to remain in their homes as owners. Since 2009 and as of the date of 
this writing, the SUN Initiative claims to have kept close to 750 Massachusetts families in their 
homes through this model, reducing their monthly mortgage payments and principal balances by 
an average of thirty-five percent.72 
Yet the SUN Initiative encountered a significant roadblock in 2010 when Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac introduced “arm’s-length” sales policies, which prohibited sales to non-profit 
institutions if the non-profit intends to resell or otherwise allow a former homeowner to continue 
to occupy the property.73 The policies required that purchasers of foreclosed properties from 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac execute an affidavit stating that the sale is an arm’s length 
transaction and that the borrower would not continue to occupy the property for longer than 90 
days after the sale or subsequently repurchase the home from the buyer.74 An additional policy 
provided that resale of a property to the original borrower, or an entity working on its behalf, 
would be permitted only if the borrower “makes whole” the Enterprise by paying back the full 
amount due under the original loan.75 The stated purpose behind the policies was to prevent 
underwater borrowers who could afford their mortgages from “strategically defaulting” in order to 
obtain a buyback sale from a nonprofit institution that would reduce their monthly mortgage 
payment.76 
These policies frustrated dozens, if not more, potential BCC sales throughout 
Massachusetts. As a result, the Legislature passed what is now known as the “Nonprofit Buyback 
Provision,” codified at M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C(h). The Provision specifically targets and makes 
illegal Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s arm’s-length transaction sales policies. It provides: 
In all circumstances in which an offer to purchase either a mortgage loan or a 
residential property is made by an entity with a tax-exempt filing status under 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or an entity controlled by an entity with 
such tax-exempt filing status, no creditor shall require as a condition of sale or 
                                                                
72  See Boston Community Capital, SUN Initiative, www.bostoncommunitycapital.org/programs-
services/sun-initiative (last accessed March 31, 2017).  
73  See Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp.  3d at 97 (noting that these policies were included in Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s “Servicing Guides to banks and other entities with whom they contract to service the mortgages under 
guarantee and/or to manage any foreclosed properties”).. 
74  Id. The policies also prohibit sales in which there is an agreement or contract providing that the original 
borrower will later have a right of first-refusal when the property is sold. Id.   
75  Id. Thus if, for example, the fair market value of the property is $100,000 at foreclosure but the original 
mortgage loan still has a balance of $250,000, the original borrower could only repurchase the property (either directly or 
through a third-party purchaser like BCC) by paying the $150,000 difference, in addition to the $100,000 purchase price. 
See id.   
76  The FHFA also expressed concern that allowing buyback sales would foster the creation of sham 
nonprofits and cause homeowners to decline loan modifications that they could afford and instead “repurchase from a 
nonprofit at a larger discount.” See Letter from FHFA General Counsel Alfred Pollard to Massachusetts Assistant 
Attorney General Lisa Dyen (Jan. 29, 2013).  
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transfer to any such entity any affidavit, statement, agreement or addendum 
limiting ownership or occupancy of the residential property by the borrower.77 
The statute explicitly includes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by name in the definition of 
“creditor.”78 
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Response to the Non-Profit Buyback Provision 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac blatantly ignored M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C and continued to 
refuse buyback sales to BCC after the law went into effect on November 1, 2012. In early 2013, 
the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General sent a letter to the General Counsel of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency urging reversal of the Enterprises’ policies to bring them into 
compliance with the state law.79 The FHFA, in a response letter, defended the Enterprises’ 
policies on the grounds that they were necessary to prevent the rise of sham nonprofits and 
strategic defaults (i.e., in which borrowers strategically opt for foreclosure in order to later obtain 
a buyback sale).80 In a second letter, the Attorney General addressed the General Counsel’s 
concerns about moral hazard but pointed out that, “you provide no information, evidence, or 
statistics to support this speculation.”81 The Letter further noted, “based on our actual experience 
in Massachusetts, the buybacks facilitated by area non-profit groups have helped stabilize 
neighborhoods and keep qualified homeowners in their homes, at no additional cost to the creditor 
or its investors (who receive the fair market value price).”82 The Letter implored that, “We cannot 
accept that a [Government Sponsored Enterprise] would prefer taking an approach that would 
leave a family homeless and keep a distressed property on its books rather than accept a non-
profit’s purchase offer at fair market value.”83 Despite this concerted advocacy, the policies 
remained in place and both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to refuse fair market value 
purchase offers from BCC. 
Following these letters, two high-profile federal lawsuits directly challenged Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac’s blatant violations of M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C.84 First, homeowners Ramon and 
                                                                
77  M.G.L. c. 244, §35C(h). 
78  M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C(a). 
79  See Letter from Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General M. Claire Masinton to Alfred M. Pollard (Feb. 
11, 2013), infra note 81. 
80  Letter from FHFA General Counsel Alfred Pollard to Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General Lisa 
Dyen, January 29, 2013. 
81  Letter from Assistant Attorney General M. Claire Masinton to Alfred M. Pollard, February 11, 2013, 
supra note 76.  
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  See Suero v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 123 F.Supp.3d 162 (D. Mass. 2015);), and Massachusetts v. 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency et al., 54 F.Supp.3d 94 (D. Mass 2014). These lawsuits received significant media attention. See 
e.g., Shaila Dewan, Massachusetts Sues Fannie and Freddie Over Foreclosure Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2014, at B3; 
Jennifer Taub, A Second Chance to Help Families Save Their Homes, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2014, available at 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/a-second-chance-to-help-families-save-their-homes/;/ [https://perma.cc/Y7Y6-
MW8F]; Jennifer Taub, New Policy Goes Only Partway in Helping Struggling Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2014, 
available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/new-policy-goes-only-partway-in-helping-struggling 
-homeowners/?_r=0; [https://perma.cc/F2LS-5G73]; Paul McMorrow, Can Freddie Mac Skirt Mass. Consumer Law?, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2014, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/05/13/freddie-mac-foreclosure-
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Rosanna Suero (“the Sueros85“), Dominican immigrants who owned a small condominium in the 
Dorchester neighborhood of Boston,86 sued Freddie Mac after it refused several fair market value 
offers from BCC to purchase their home.87 The Sueros purchased their condominium in 2005 
through a mortgage for $283,000, and in 2007 refinanced for a $298,000 mortgage.88 Unable to 
afford the high mortgage payments, in September 2010 their home was foreclosed.89 Freddie 
Mac, which was the underlying investor in the mortgage loan, purchased the property as the 
highest bidder at foreclosure for $110,000.90 The Sueros then applied and were approved by BCC 
for a buyback sale.91 BCC extended four fair market value offers to purchase the Sueros’ home 
between November 1, 2012, the day M.G.L. c. 244, § 35C went into effect, and August 15, 
2013.92 Freddie Mac rejected all four offers. In the course of the litigation, it admitted in sworn 
statements that it rejected all four offers because it knew that BCC intended to resell to the 
Sueros, citing its arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies.93 Throughout this entire post-
foreclosure period, the Sueros continued living in their home but were fighting eviction by 
Freddie Mac in Boston Housing Court.94 
B. The Suero and Attorney General Suits for Noncompliance with the Non-Profit Buyback Law 
The Sueros sued Freddie Mac under M.G.L. c. 93A, a broad state consumer protection 
law. The law provides a cause of action to consumers injured by a commercial or business entity’s 
violation of a statute intended to protect the public’s “health, safety, or welfare.”95 The Sueros 
alleged that Freddie Mac violated the letter and/or spirit of M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C by refusing to 
sell their home to BCC solely because of BCC’s intention to resell to them in a buyback sale.96  
                                                                
battle-hits-close-home/BkGm0ARBhJUpoD0cChOa4K/story.html. [https://perma.cc/V6GT-4X8L]. See also Paul 
McMorrow, Housing Recovery? Not For All, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2013, at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013 
/02/05/housing-recovery-leaves-marginalized-behind/nvhK5xfDWI20gulXC0rmeJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/H4FP38J
K] (reporting on earlier litigation in the Suero case in Boston Housing Court). 
85  The author tells the Sueros’ story with their permission.  
86  The Dorchester neighborhood was particularly hit hard hit by the foreclosure crisis. See Hartigan, supra, 
note 33 at 187.  See also Laura Crimaldi, Foreclosure Crisis Hits Dorchester Renters Hard, Feb. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2009/02/foreclosure_crisis_hits_dorchester_renters_hard. 
[https://perma.cc/T8H5-7WBT]. 
87  See Suero v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., et al., 123 F. Supp. 3d 162 (2015).  
88  Id. at 166. 
89  Id.  
90  Id.  
91  Id.  
92  Id. at 167. The first two offers were for $90,000, an amount a BCC appraiser had determined to be fair 
market value based on the amounts identical condominiums in the same building had sold for within the past year. During 
the course of the litigation, a Senior REO Sales Manager at Freddie Mac attested in an affidavit that fair market value for 
the Sueros’ condominium was between $110,000 and $115,000.  BCC then made offers for $110,000 and $115,000.  Id. 
93  See Suero SOF, Statement 19.  
94  In Massachusetts, former homeowners have a right to continue living in their home after foreclosure until 
the new owner (i.e., the purchaser at foreclosure) obtains a final judgment of eviction through a summary process action. 
See Bank of New York v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (2011).  Homeowners have a right to challenge validity of the foreclosure 
in the eviction proceedings. See id.  
95  See M.G.L. c. 93A, s. 2(a); 940 C.M.R. 3.16(3).  
96  It is well established that a practice may be considered a violation of M.G.L. c. 93A if it is “within at 
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The Sueros sought declaratory and injunctive relief, namely an order requiring Freddie Mac to 
sell their home to BCC for fair market value free of any restrictions on resale.97 Although the 
Sueros brought the action in state court, Freddie Mac promptly removed to federal court pursuant 
to a provision of HERA granting the Enterprises an unconditional right to removal.98 
The Sueros were granted a preliminary injunction upon a federal court’s finding of 
likelihood of success on the merits.99 The injunction prohibited Freddie Mac from evicting the 
Sueros and also from selling the property to a third party while the litigation was ongoing.100 
Shortly thereafter, the Massachusetts Attorney General filed a separate suit against Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) alleging widespread 
noncompliance with the nonprofit buyback provision of M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C.101 The suit claimed 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s blanket refusal to engage in buyback programs like those 
offered by BCC unfairly and illegally was causing Massachusetts residents to lose their homes.102 
The Complaint cited several instances in which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refused buyback 
offers from BCC to purchase foreclosed homes at fair market value based on their arms’-length 
transaction and make-whole policies.103 The suit sought a declaration that Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae’s policies violate M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C, as well as an order enjoining the Enterprises 
from carrying out their arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies in Massachusetts.104 
Also originally filed in State superior court, the defendants again removed to the federal system. 
Around the same time, FHFA intervened in the Suero matter, taking the position that it had an 
interest in the litigation due to its role as conservator of Freddie Mac. 
The federal courts ultimately issued judgments in favor of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and 
FHFA in both cases.105 In the Attorney General litigation, the Court granted the entities’ motion 
to dismiss, and in the Suero matter the Court granted summary judgment for Freddie Mac and 
FHFA on the Sueros’ M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C claim.106 107 In both cases, the Court found that the 
                                                                
least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness.” PMP Assoc., Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975).  In Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment & Loan, a predatory lending case, 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that conduct that results in an outcome with a similar “element of unfairness” as that 
which a statute prohibits is also unfair and deceptive and in violation of M.G.L. c. 93A. 452 Mass. 733 (2008).   
97  See Suero, 123 F.Supp.3d at 163, 174-175164. 
98  Id. at 164. 
99  See Suero v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2013 WL 6709001 (D. Mass, Dec. 17, 2013). 
100 Id. at *8. 
101 See Massachusetts, 54 F.Supp.3d at94, 97. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 97. 
104 Id. at 97. 
105 In response to enormous pressure from the media and the public after the rulings in Suero and 
Massachusetts, FHFA subsequently directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to reverse their arm’s-length transaction and 
make-whole policies and would allow nonprofit buyback sales. See FHFA Directs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Change 
Requirement Relating to Sales of Existing REO, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency Press Release, Nov. 25, 2014, available at  Steve 
Meacham, A Huge Victory for Homeowners in Crisis, and the Struggle Continues, available at http://righttothecity.org/a-
huge-victory-for-homeowners-in-crisis-and-the-struggle-continues/./ [https://perma.cc/X25B-KEPP]. 
106 The Sueros brought several other claims against Freddie Mac in the same matter.  These claims included 
other unfair and deceptive practices claims under M.G.L. c. 93A and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Summary judgment was granted solely on the Sueros’ violation of M.G.L. c. 244 § 35C claim (brought under 
M.G.L. c. 93A). See Complaint, Suero, 123 F.Supp.3d 162at 175. The other claims were later resolved in a settlement 
between the parties.   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss4/1
SUMMERS HERA FORMATTED 20.4.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2017  5:08 PM 
2017] FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC’S SUBVERSION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW UNDER HERA 287 
Anti-Injunction Provision of HERA, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (“the Anti-Injunction Provision”), 
barred the Court from granting the declaratory and injunctive relief sought. The Anti-Injunction 
Provision expressly prohibits any “court [from] tak[ing] any action to restrain or affect the 
exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as conservator. . .”108 
FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac initially took the position that the Anti-Injunction 
Provision prohibited the courts from enjoining the reversal of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies because the policies were the result of a 
“directive” from FHFA.109 FHFA, they initially argued, directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
“implement and enforce” the policies in its capacity as conservator, and therefore the Anti-
Injunction Provision applied.110 The Commonwealth and the Sueros countered that there was no 
evidence that FHFA directed or took any affirmative action with regard to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s adoption of the arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies, and therefore 
the Anti-Injunction Provision could not apply.111 
The Enterprises and FHFA changed their position after the Commonwealth and the 
Sueros pointed to the lack of FHFA involvement in the policies. In both cases, the Enterprises and 
FHFA abandoned their claim that a supposed FHFA “directive” regarding the policies had been 
issued, which therefore triggered the Anti-Injunction Provision. Instead, they argued that the mere 
fact that the policies existed within the conservatorship structure warranted application of the 
Provision. In the Commonwealth litigation, FHFA and the Enterprises took the position that: 
The [arm’s-length transaction] requirement and make-whole policy protect the 
assets of the Enterprises from risks that FHFA has identified and are therefore 
within the powers and functions of the Conservator. By seeking to enjoin 
Defendants from implementing those prudential policies, the Commonwealth 
demands relief that would ‘restrain or affect’ the Conservator’s exercise of its 
powers. . . .112 
In the Suero matter, Freddie Mac and FHFA strikingly argued that all Freddie Mac 
decisions and operations represent an exercise of the conservator’s powers simply by virtue of 
Freddie Mac’s status in conservatorship, and that all Freddie Mac practices are therefore shielded 
from judicial review under the Anti-Injunction Provision.113 They stated that, “this Court is 
without jurisdiction to grant the requested relief regardless of whether FHFA has already 
                                                                
107  The two cases were decided by different judges, both in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts.  Judge Richard Stearns presided over Mass. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency et al., and Magistrate Judge Judith 
Dein presided over Suero v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. 
108  12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). 
109  Massachusetts, 54 F.Supp.3d at94, 97. 
110  Id. at 9799. In the Suero matter, the defendants pointed to a July 3, 2012 email from FHFA to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac related to short sales as evidence of an FHFA “directive.”  See Suero, 123 F.Supp.3d at 171.  The 
email contained no reference to the arm’s-length transaction or make whole policies, and did not relate to post-foreclosure 
practices. Id.   
111  Suero at 171. 
112  Combined Reply Brief of Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac in Support of Def. 
Motion to Dismiss, Massachusetts, at 2. 
113  Combined Reply Brief of Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency and Freddie Mac in Support of Def. Cross-Motion for 
Summ. J, Suero.  
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exercised its powers. . . All of Freddie Mac’s acts embody exercise of the Conservator’s statutory 
power to operate the Enterprise as its successor. . .”114 They further argued that any “injunction 
compelling Freddie Mac to sell the property at issue to BCC for resale to the Sueros necessarily 
restrains the Conservator’s ability to dispose of an asset of the conservatorship on the terms that 
the Conservator deems appropriate.”115 
In both cases, the Courts declined to extend the applicability of the Anti-Injunction 
Provision to the scope urged by FHFA and the Enterprises. Yet they determined that there had 
been sufficient FHFA action in relation to the Enterprises’ arm’s-length transaction and make-
whole policies to trigger application of the Anti-Injunction Provision in these cases. In the 
Commonwealth litigation, the Court concluded that FHFA had “acted” as conservator in relation 
to the policies when it endorsed the restrictions in its January 2013 letter to the Commonwealth, 
and also by “vigorously defending” the policies in the present litigation.116 The Court reasoned 
that, “FHFA ‘acts’ by affirmatively supporting the continued application of the restrictions.”117 
The Suero Court adopted this reasoning, declaring that the applicability of HERA’s Anti-
Injunction Provision “is not confined to situations in which FHFA engages in affirmative acts by 
issuing specific directives or statements instructing [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] to implement 
specified policies.”118 While conceding that FHFA “may not have ‘acted’ by issuing a formal 
directive relative to sales of foreclosed homes,” the Suero Court agreed with the Commonwealth 
Court that FHFA’s January 2013 letter and its efforts to defend Freddie Mac against the present 
legal challenge to the policies totaled a sufficient level of involvement to support application of 
the Anti-Injunction Provision.119 
The Courts also found that FHFA took this loosely-defined “action” in its capacity as 
conservator. FHFA has duties as both conservator and regulator, but the Anti-Injunction Provision 
states only that, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or 
functions of the Agency as conservator or receiver.” Pursuant to this statutory language, only 
FHFA action taken within its capacity as conservator (or receiver, in the case of a receivership) is 
shielded from judicial review.120 As Conservator, FHFA has the power to take only such action as 
is both “(i) necessary to put [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] in a sound and solvent condition; and 
(ii) appropriate to. . . preserve. . . [their] assets and property.”121 Unless these criteria are met, an 
FHFA action is considered to be regulatory.122 
The Courts in both cases concluded that FHFA’s defense of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
                                                                
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Massachusetts, 54 F.Supp.3d at 99.  
117  Id.  
118  Suero, 123 F.Supp.3d at 171. 
119  Suero, at 171-173. 
120  See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (“no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or 
functions of the Agency as conservator or receiver”).  See also Leon County, Fla. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 
1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). 
121  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D). 
122  Regulatory action requires compliance with the relevant provisions of the APA and is subject to judicial 
review. See Leon County, 700 F.3d at 1278 (“Although it may appear at first blush that many of the functions of the FHFA 
as regulator and as conservator overlap, we consider both the concept and function of a conservatorship and the overall 
statutory scheme to determine whether the actions of the FHFA. . . should be deemed an act taken by the FHFA as 
conservator, insulated from judicial review, or an act of rulemaking within its function as a regulator”).  
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Mac’s arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies was within the scope of its 
conservatorship powers, pursuant to this statutory provision. The Court in the Commonwealth 
matter pointed to FHFA’s characterization of the policies during the course of the litigation as 
“protective measures against perceived risks that [that fall] squarely within FHFA’s power as 
conservator,” and noted that FHFA had articulated, again in the course of the litigation, a 
“potential risk of financial loss in abiding by [the non-profit buyback provision of M.G.L. c. 244 
s. 35C].” The Court concluded that, based on these positions, “the decision to reject [the terms of 
the statute] may be fairly characterized as a business judgment intended to ‘preserve and conserve 
the [GSE’s] assets and property,’” and therefore was a conservator action that was shielded from 
judicial review.123 The Suero Court adopted the same reasoning, emphasizing that Freddie Mac 
and FHFA, “have demonstrated how FHFA’s adoption of the [arm’s-length transaction] and 
Make-Whole policies furthers its statutory mission as a protective conservator.”124 
C. Anti-Injunction Provision Precedent: PACE Program Litigation 
The Suero and Commonwealth decisions drastically misconstrue HERA’s Anti-
Injunction Provision and expand its scope to shield from judicial review a much broader array of 
activity than ever previously sanctioned. It is well established, and indeed the Courts in the Suero 
and Commonwealth cases do not dispute, that the Anti-Injunction Provision does not insulate all 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae actions from judicial review, but rather exempts only those actions 
taken by FHFA as conservator.125 Yet courts previously had much more narrowly- and 
rigorously-defined interpretations of what actions qualify as “taken by FHFA as conservator.” 
Most cases relating to the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Provision involve an 
FHFA directive related to the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. In the 2000s, 
many local governments established PACE programs to “assist[] citizens in obtaining funds to 
finance home improvements aimed at achieving energy efficiency.”126 To secure repayment of 
these funds, properties are encumbered with a lien that, in certain jurisdictions, takes priority over 
all other liens.127 On July 6, 2010, FHFA issued a formal statement instructing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to take certain “prudential actions” aimed at preventing the acquisition of mortgages 
encumbered with first-priority PACE liens.128 To comply with this directive, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac announced that they would stop purchasing mortgages encumbered with first-
priority PACE liens originating after July 6, 2010.129 
Shortly thereafter, several local governments sued FHFA, claiming that its directive 
would destroy the PACE program.130 The suits sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit 
                                                                
123  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
124  Suero, at 174. 
125  See Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chicago, 926 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1059 (N.D.Ill. 2014) (“HERA 
expressly prohibits other federal agencies and states from interfering with actions taken by FHFA as conservator”) 
(emphasis added); Town of Babylon v. FHFA, 699 F.3d 221, 229 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that HERA “excludes judicial 
review of ‘the exercise of powers or functions’ given to FHFA as conservator”) (quoting Leon County, 700 F.3d at 1278) 
(emphasis added). 
126  Leon County at 1276; County of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2013). 
127  See id.  
128  See Town of Babylon, at 225-26; see also Leon County, at 1276. 
129  Leon County, at 1276. 
130  Id. 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from implementing the announced restrictions.131 FHFA filed 
motions to dismiss on the ground that the Anti-Injunction Provision barred the courts from 
granting the relief sought. These motions were uniformly granted and upheld on appeal. As a 
preliminary matter, the courts accepted that FHFA has separate roles as regulator and conservator 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and that only its actions taken as conservator are shielded from 
judicial review under the Anti-Injunction Provision.132 Pursuant to its regulatory authority, the 
FHFA may “issue any regulations, guidelines, or orders necessary to carry out the duties of the 
Director under this chapter [of HERA] or the authorizing statutes, and to ensure the purposes of 
this chapter and the authorizing statutes are accomplished.”133 When issuing regulations, the 
FHFA must comply with the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, such as 
notice and the opportunity for public comment.134 As discussed supra, as conservator, the FHFA 
is empowered only to “take such action as may be (i) necessary to put [Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac] in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of [Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac] and preserve and conserve the assets of [Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac].” 
To determine whether the PACE directive was issued by FHFA in its role as conservator 
or as regulator, the courts closely examined how the directive aligned with “both the concept and 
function of a conservatorship and the overall statutory scheme [of HERA],” and considered “all 
relevant factors” including “its subject matter, its purpose, its outcome, and whether it involves a 
matter in which public comment might be relevant, appropriate, useful or intended by 
                                                                
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 1278 (“Although it may appear at first blush that many of the functions of the FHFA as regulator 
and as conservator overlap, we consider both the concept and function of a conservatorship and the overall statutory 
scheme to determine whether the actions of the FHFA in issuing its directive regarding PACE mortgages should be 
deemed an act taken by the FHFA as conservator, shielded from judicial review, or an act of rulemaking within its 
function as regulator”).   
133  12 U.S.C. § 4526(a); 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B). See Leon County at 1276. The full text of the provision 
states that the “principal duties” of the FHFA as regulator are:   
(A) to oversee the prudential operations of each regulated entity; and 
(B) to ensure that— 
(i) each regulated entity operates in a safe and sound manner, including maintenance of adequate 
capital and internal controls; 
(ii) the operations and activities of each regulated entity foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and 
resilient national housing finance markets (including activities relating to mortgages on housing for 
low––and moderate-income families involving a reasonable economic return that may be less than 
the return earned on other activities); 
(iii) each regulated entity complies with this chapter and the rules, regulations, guidelines, and 
orders issued under this chapter and the authorizing statutes; 
(iv) each regulated entity carries out its statutory mission only through activities that are authorized 
under and consistent with this chapter and the authorizing statutes; and 
(v) the activities of each regulated entity and the manner in which such regulated entity is operated 
are consistent with the public interest. 
12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B). As regulator, FHFA also has the duty to “establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of 
[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac], to ensure that the holdings are backed by sufficient capital and consistent with the mission 
and the safe and sound operations of [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac].”12 U.S.C. § 4624(a). 
134  12 U.S.C. § 4526(b). 
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Congress.”135 The Courts found that the FHFA issued its PACE directive in its capacity as 
conservator because the directive applied to a relatively small number of residential mortgages 
available to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mortgage market as a whole, had a very narrow 
field of operation, and “did not establish a general set of criteria to be applied across the board by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their mortgage transactions in general.”136 The directive, rather, 
appeared to be a “discrete management decision by a conservator.”137 The Ninth Circuit also 
emphasized that the directive fell within the conservatorship powers because it “related directly to 
the soundness of the Enterprises’ assets” because PACE liens substantially increase the risk of 
acquiring a mortgage.138 
D. Expansion of the Anti-Injunction Provision Through the Non-Profit Buyback Law Litigation 
The Suero and Commonwealth Courts’ reasoning and conclusions represent a sharp 
departure from the PACE Courts’ precedent. First, whereas the Anti-Injunction Provision was 
applied in the PACE context where there was clear and unambiguous action taken by FHFA, in 
the buyback context FHFA’s “action” was vague, amorphous, and post-hoc. Both the instructions 
and the binding force were explicit in the PACE directive..On July 6, 2010, FHFA announced, 
“Today, FHFA is directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks to 
undertake the following prudential actions. . .”139 The directive went on to enumerate three 
specific actions it was requiring the Enterprises to take concerning the PACE programs, one of 
which had several subparts and included an instruction to the Enterprises to issue additional 
guidance as needed.140 On July 14, 2010, FHFA issued a subsequent statement that “[i]n keeping 
with [its] safety and soundness obligations,” it would “defend vigorously” its policies laid out in 
the July 6, 2010 statement.141  In total, FHFA issued five formal statements and letters to the 
Enterprises, servicers, state bank supervisors, credit union supervisors, mortgage lenders, state 
governors and legislatures, and the public regarding the PACE directive, reflecting careful, 
conscious, and deliberate decision-making.142 
By contrast, in the buyback context, FHFA had been silent on Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s arm’s-length transaction and make-whole policies until the Massachusetts litigation 
began.143 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted the policies on their own, without any 
involvement by FHFA. Unlike the explicit and specific directive at issue in the PACE cases, 
FHFA never made any formal statement about the Enterprises’ buyback policies, never gave any 
specific instructions to the Enterprises, and never made any statement of binding force regarding 
                                                                
135  Leon County, at 1278. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. See also County of Sonoma, 710 F.Supp.3d at 993 (“A decision not to buy assets that FHFA deems 
risky is within its conservator power to ‘carry on’ the Enterprises’ businesses and to ‘preserve and conserve the assets and 
property of the [Enterprises]’”), quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
138  See County of Sonoma, 710 F.Supp.3d at 993. 
139  Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement on Certain Energy Retrofit Home Loan Programs (2010). 
140  Id. 
141  FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR EDWARD J. DEMARCO ON PACE PROGRAMS 
(2010).   
142  See County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 990-92.   
143  Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 99; Suero, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 171. 
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these, or any other, residential property sales policies.144 At most, FHFA stated that it supported 
the buyback policies once the policies were challenged in litigation, and articulated a rationale for 
choosing to do so.145 
This broadening of the requisite FHFA “action” necessary to trigger the Anti-Injunction 
Provision represents a significant expansion of the Provision’s meaning and scope. FHFA’s acts 
as conservator have involved significant initiatives directed at correcting systemic flaws in the 
Enterprises’ business models. These have included building a Common Securitization Platform 
for issuing mortgage-backed securities, reducing the risk-exposure associated with the 
Enterprises’ single-family mortgage credit guarantee business, and reducing the Enterprises’ 
retained and multifamily portfolios.146 Because FHFA re-delegated to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac control of their day-to-day operations and normal business activities, it logically follows that 
FHFA’s conservator actions have been limited to larger directives such as these. And the 
application of the Anti-Injunction Provision, up until the Massachusetts and Suero decisions, had 
consistently tracked these types of actions. Thus, the meaning of the language of the provision, 
“no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] 
as conservator. . .” had meant that no court may enjoin conservator directives or other 
initiatives.147 
With Massachusetts and Suero, however, the meaning of this Provision expanded to 
prohibit courts from enjoining any action taken by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac that FHFA later 
chooses to defend as a legitimate business interest. Thus, no longer is the Anti-Injunction 
Provision limited to shielding from judicial review only actions clearly and affirmatively taken by 
FHFA. Now, any action undertaken by an Enterprise may be insulated from review so long as 
FHFA, once the action is challenged, comes to its defense. Such an expansion poses a serious 
threat to the fate of state consumer protection laws as they apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac—now, whenever the Enterprises wish to flout such laws, they may make their own decision 
to do so and later obtain immunity if FHFA takes their side. 
Second, Massachusetts and Suero significantly weaken the analytical rigor with which 
the conservatorship (versus regulator) action test is applied. As previously described, in the PACE 
program cases, the courts applied a multifactorial test for determining whether the action taken by 
FHFA falls within its capacity as conservator or regulator, including assessing whether the action 
meets the statutory standard for conservatorship action as “(i) necessary to put the [Enterprises] in 
a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the [Enterprises] 
and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the [Enterprises].”148 Whereas the PACE 
Courts assessed FHFA’s action in terms of “its subject matter, its purpose, its outcome, and 
whether it involves a matter in which public comment might be relevant, appropriate, useful[,] or 
intended by Congress[,]”149 the absence of any clearly defined FHFA “action” in the nonprofit 
buyback law litigation eluded such analysis. 
Instead of undertaking a rigorous assessment of the factors deemed relevant by the courts 
                                                                
144  See generally Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d 94; Suero, 123 F. Supp. 3d 162. 
145  See Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 101. 
146  FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2013, at 1-5 (2014), available at 
https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs. [https://perma.cc/DE64-2W2Y]. 
147  See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (“no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or 
functions of the Agency as conservator or receiver”). 
148  12 U.S.C. 4617(f). 
149  Leon County, 700 F.3d at 1278. 
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in the PACE cases, the Courts in Suero and Massachusetts engaged in a superficial analysis that 
diluted the test to a determination of whether FHFA’s position “may be fairly characterized as a 
business judgment intended to ‘preserve and conserve [the Enterprises’] assets and property.’”150 
The Court in Massachusetts began by noting that “[c]ourts have uniformly held that the FHFA is 
acting as the [Enterprises]’ conservator when it evaluates the risks of certain business transactions 
and takes prudential action to avoid those that it deems undesirable.”151 It then cited to FHFA’s 
positions regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s buyback policies as stated in their 
memorandums of law, submitted in the course of the instant litigation, as evidence that it had 
performed such a risk evaluation.152 It concluded that, “[b]ecause defendants have articulated a 
potential risk of financial loss in abiding by the restrictions of the Non-Profit Buyback Provision, 
the decision to reject these terms may be fairly characterized as a business judgment intended to 
preserve and conserve [the Enterprises]’ assets and property,” and declared that the Anti-
Injunction Provision applied.153 
This is precisely the sort of weak analysis the PACE courts expressly rejected. 
“Congress[,]” the Eleventh Circuit noted, “did not intend that the nature of the FHFA’s actions 
would be determined based upon the FHFA’s self-declarations because the distinction between 
regulator and conservator would be one without a meaning or effect. The FHFA cannot evade 
judicial scrutiny by merely labeling its actions with a conservator stamp.”154 Here, FHFA’s self-
serving declaration in litigation and pre-litigation statements that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
buyback policies are a business necessity is a thinly-veiled “conservator stamp.” It is clear from 
the evidence set forth in both Massachusetts and Suero, and indeed it is undisputed, that FHFA 
never engaged in any business analysis of the buyback policies. The materials submitted in 
litigation were devoid of, for example, any affidavits from persons in authority at FHFA, or any 
other evidence, indicating a financial risk assessment was ever performed. What is clear, rather, is 
that FHFA jumped to the Enterprises’ defense once it was clear that the legality of their policies 
was threatened by state consumer protection law, and merely by labeling the policies as a business 
necessity succeeded in shielding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s own decisions from judicial 
review. Such decisions suggest, contrary to all precedent and statutory language, that any Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac policy may be insulated from review wherever FHFA articulates a business 
justification for it in litigation. If other jurisdictions choose to follow this rule, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac essentially will be given carte blanche to flout state consumer protection laws 
whenever either of them, and FHFA post hoc, so choose.. 
III. FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC’S FIGHT AGAINST LIABILITY FOR MULTIPLE 
DAMAGES UNDER M.G.L. C. 93A, MASSACHUSETTS’ UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 
ACT 
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as Landlords in Massachusetts 
While this Article has thus far analyzed how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
wrongfully invoked HERA to subvert homeowner protections, it will now turn to how they have 
                                                                
150  Massachusetts, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 101,  (citing 12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii)). 
151  Id. at 100. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 101 
154  Leon County, 700 F.3d at 1278. 
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similarly misused the statute to undermine tenant rights. In Massachusetts, where a property is 
foreclosed and purchased by the foreclosing bank at auction,155 existing tenants have a right to 
continue renting until the property is sold to a bona fide third party.156 Tenants may be evicted for 
failure to pay rent or for otherwise violating a term of the tenancy, but may not be evicted for “no 
cause,” i.e., at the expiration of a lease term or upon the landlord’s election to terminate the 
monthly tenancy, as is normally permissible under Massachusetts law.157 Because it is Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s business models to purchase the homes they foreclose unless they are 
outbid by a third party purchaser, the effect of this law is that the Enterprises have become 
landlords to hundreds if not thousands of tenants across the Commonwealth. 
As has now been well documented by academia and the media alike, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac do an extremely poor job at maintaining basic habitable conditions in the properties 
they come to own after foreclosure (known as “real estate owned” or REO properties).158 One 
federal lawsuit, filed in late 2016 by the National Fair Housing Alliance and twenty local fair 
housing groups across the country, alleges that Fannie Mae purposefully neglects REO properties 
located in black and Latino neighborhoods, and takes relatively better care of equivalent homes in 
working- and middle-class white areas.159 The lawsuit followed years of investigation into Fannie 
Mae’s REO properties across the country, which uncovered persistent and widespread neglect of 
properties located in minority neighborhoods.160 As just a few examples, the groups found that 
nationwide, of Fannie Mae REO properties located in communities of color, 24% had ten or more 
maintenance or marketing deficiencies, 39% had trash visible on the property, 24.9% had 
unsecure or broken doors, and 41.5% had damaged, boarded, or unsecured windows.161 These 
figures were all significantly higher than their equivalents in white neighborhoods.162 
In addition to the data collected by the fair housing groups, a 2015 study of housing 
conditions in post-foreclosure properties in Boston specifically found that from 2011-2013, bank-
                                                                
155  Under the Enterprises' own business models, and pursuant to their contracts, loan servicers conduct 
foreclosure sales on mortgages owned by the Enterprises on their behalf, and must sell the properties to the Enterprises as 
the highest bidder unless outbid by a third party. See supra note 58. 
156  See.MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 186A, § 2 (2010) (“Tenant Protections in Foreclosed Properties.””).   
157  See id. Note that the Massachusetts statute provides significantly greater protections than were provided 
by the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA), which allowed foreclosing purchasers to evict 
tenants for no cause, but required a 90-day notice period prior to doing so.  
158  Editorial Board, The Housing Crisis Lives on for Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/opinion/the-housing-crisis-lives-on-for-minorities.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1; 
[https://perma.cc/UDR4-4LYS]; Carrie Wells, Fannie Mae Accused of Neglecting Foreclosures in Minority 
Neighborhoods, BALT. SUN, May 13, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/real-estate/wonk/bs-bz-fannie-mae-
housing-complaint-20150513-story.html; [https://perma.cc/7BSQ-DV5P?type=image]; Mark Matthews, Tenants Accuse 
Fannie Mae of Being a Slumlord, ABC 7 NEWS, Oct. 28, 2011, http://abc7news.com/archive/8410525/./ 
[https://perma.cc/69KT-BEH2].  See also NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, EVICTION (WITHOUT) 
NOTICE: RENTERS AND THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 26 (2012).  
159  See Complaint and Jury Demand, Nat’l. Fair Housing Alliance, et al. v. Fed. Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n 
(“Fannie Mae”),”), No. 3:16-cv-06969 (N.D. Cal. Filedfiled Dec. 5, 2016).  
160  See id. According to the Complaint, the research was conducted between July, 2011, and October, 2015. 
See Complaint, id., at ¶ 3.  
161  See Complaint, id., at ¶ 10. 
162  See id.  In predominantly white neighborhoods, only 6% of REO properties had ten or more maintenance 
or marketing deficiencies, 14.9% had visible trash on the property, 11.1% had unsecured or broken doors, and 19.1% had 
damaged, boarded, or unsecured windows. Id.  
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owned properties had disproportionately higher rates of Inspectional Service Department requests 
related to housing maintenance, property neglect, and human-generated problems. 163  It also 
found a disproportionately high number of citations for Housing Code violations as compared to 
post-foreclosure properties owned by owner-occupants or investors.164  While the study does not 
break down data by specific post-foreclosure landlord, it concluded that larger entities, such as 
banks or trusts, “do a worse job at property upkeep than smaller or local investors.”165 And were 
there any doubt about the applicability of this study to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the sheer 
volume of conditions-based claims filed by tenants against them in Massachusetts Housing Courts 
serves as a miner’s canary.166 
B. Litigating Poor Housing Conditions in Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, tenants have numerous options to assert claims against their landlords 
when they suffer conditions of disrepair in their homes. Generally speaking, tenants have a right 
to withhold rent for bad conditions, and also have a cause of action against their landlord, which 
they may assert in several different forums including Housing Court.167 The common law implied 
warranty of habitability and the covenant of quiet enjoyment statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 186, 
§ 14, both provide protections against poor housing conditions and entitle tenants to damages 
when their landlords fail to make necessary repairs.168 Damages for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability are measured by “the difference between the value of the dwelling as 
warranted and the value of the dwelling as it exists in its defective condition.”169 Mass. Gen. Laws 
c. 186, § 14, entitles tenants to damages in the amount of actual damages, equivalent to the 
implied warranty of habitability damages, or three months’ rent, whichever is greater.170 
Yet the strongest habitability protection is arguably provided under state consumer 
protection law M.G.L. c. 93A (“Chapter 93A”). This statute generally prohibits “unfair methods 
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.”171 In the landlord-tenant context, it is well established that Chapter 93A prohibits 
landlords from leasing premises with poor conditions.172 While in many ways duplicative of the 
                                                                
163  See Hwang, supra note 28, at 24-25. 
164  See id.  
165  See id. 
166  See e.g. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n v. Horsley, Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-130 (Sept. 11, 2015); Fed. Nat. 
Mortg. Ass’n v. Phillips, Bost. Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-2217 (March 19, 2015). 
167  M.G.L c.MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 239, § 8A; M.G.L c.MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 286, § 14; St. 1979, c. 72, § 
3, codified as M.G.L.A. c.MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 185C, § 3. 
168  See Cruz Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Wideman, 417 Mass. 771, 775 (1994); Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 
872 (1991); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973).  
169  Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 203 (footnote omitted). 
170  See Cruz Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Thomas, 417 Mass. 782 n.7 (1994), citing M.G.L. c. 186 § 14 (1992 ed.). 
171  M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a).  
172  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 317; Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855 (1991). Note that Chapter 93A 
only imposes liability against landlords who rent three or more units, and does not apply to government entities (e.g., 
public housing authorities).  See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Howard, 427 Mass. 537 (1998) (Chapter 93A does not apply to 
housing authorities); Billings v. Wilson, 397 Mass. 614 (1986) (Chapter 93A does not apply to a landlord of an owner-
occupied two-family dwelling); Young v. Patukonis, 24 Mass. App. 907 (1987) (rescript) (Chapter 93A does not apply to 
landlord of owner-occupied three-family dwelling).  
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protections contained in M.G.L. c. 186 § 14 and the implied warranty of habitability, the unique 
strength of the Chapter 93A protections lies in the statute’s damage provisions. Whereas M.G.L. 
c. 186 § 14 damages are capped at the greater of actual damages or three months’ rent, and 
warranty of habitability damages are limited to actual damages only, Chapter 93A allows for 
multiple damages. Specifically, successful Chapter 93A claimants are entitled to actual damages 
or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater, and if a judge determines that the violation was 
“willful” or “knowing,” the claimant is entitled to not less than double and not more than triple 
the amount of actual damages.173 For this reason, it is well understood that tenants with persistent 
and serious defective conditions have their strongest legal anchor in Chapter 93A, rather than the 
other overlapping statutory and common law grounds.174 
Conditions-based claims are particularly important in the overall context of tenants’ 
rights in Massachusetts because they serve as both defenses and counterclaims in an eviction 
action.175 Under Massachusetts law, where a landlord seeks to evict a tenant for no fault176 or non-
payment of rent, the tenant is entitled to possession if the value of his or her claims exceeds the 
amount of rent owed, if any.177 Thus, for example, if a landlord establishes that a tenant owes 
$2,000 in rent, but the value of the tenant’s conditions-based and other claims against the landlord 
are determined to be $2,001 or higher, the tenant is entitled to possession. The tenant is also 
entitled to a money judgment in the amount of the difference.178 
Thus, by significantly amplifying the potential value of tenants’ conditions-based claims 
with its double or treble damages provisions, Chapter 93A provides a strong legal hook to tenants 
both to defend against an eviction for non-payment of rent and/or to recover significant money 
damages.179 And importantly, from a public policy perspective, these provisions serve as a 
powerful bulwark against the inclination of landlords, particularly in poor communities, to allow 
property conditions to deteriorate. 180 
C. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Legal Challenges to Chapter 93A Multiple Damages 
Since 2014, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have asserted in dozens of cases in 
Massachusetts Housing Courts that they cannot be held liable for double or treble damages under 
                                                                
173  M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). See also Dorgan v. Loukas, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 959 (1985). 
174  For example, if a tenant in a $1,200 per month apartment suffers actual damages for bad conditions 
equal to $4,000 and a judge determines that the persistence of bad conditions was willful or knowing, the tenant is entitled 
to at least $8,000 and up to $12,000 under Chapter 93A.  Under the implied warranty of habitability, damages are $4,000 
and under M.G.L. c. 186, § 14, damages are $4,800 (three months’ rent).  
175  See M.G.L. c. 239, § 8A.  
176  A no fault eviction is an eviction action brought at the expiration of a lease or upon the termination of a 
term (e.g. month-to-month) tenancy.  
177  See M.G.L. c. 298, § 8A.  
178  If the value of the tenant’s claims is found to be less than the rent owed, but the Court determines that 
the tenant withheld rent in good faith (because of defective conditions), the tenant is entitled to a ten-day post-judgment 
cure period. See id. If the tenant pays the remaining money owed within the period, she retains possession. Id. 
179  Former homeowners are also entitled to assert counterclaims and defenses under M.G.L. c. 93A in 
eviction actions. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 626 (2013). 
180  See Haddad, 410 Mass. at 869 (“deterrence is an important goal of the multiple damages provisions of 
[Chapter] 93A, including within the landlord tenant context”).  
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Chapter 93A pursuant to the HERA “Anti-Penalty Provision.”181 The Provision provides, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Applicability: The provisions of this subsection shall apply with respect to 
the Agency in any case in which the Agency is acting as conservator or 
receiver. . . . 
(4) Penalties and fines: The Agency shall not be liable for any amounts in the 
nature of penalties or fines, including those arising from the failure of any 
person to pay any real property, personal property, probate, or recording tax 
or any recording or filing fees when due.182 
The “Agency” is defined by the statute as the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA).183 Procedurally, the Enterprises seek immunity by filing motions to strike or dismiss 
multiple damages in the early stages of eviction actions in which the tenant had asserted claims 
under Chapter 93A in his or her answer. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac argue that they are exempt 
from punitive damages while in conservatorship pursuant to federal law, which preempts any state 
law to the contrary. Specifically, they argue that, because FHFA as conservator has succeeded to 
the assets of the Enterprises, “while under conservatorship with the FHFA, [the Enterprises are] 
statutorily exempt from taxes, penalties, and fines to the same extent that the FHFA is.”184 For 
support, they cite to Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP and Higgins 
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, two cases in which courts held that the anti-penalty provision 
of HERA exempted the Enterprises from liability for statutory multiple damages. 
D. Housing Courts’ Adoption of Ex. Rel. Hager and Higgins Precedent 
Massachusetts Housing Courts have nearly uniformly granted the Enterprises’ motions, 
accepting the argument that the Anti-Penalty Provision immunizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
from Chapter 93A multiple damages.  They have provided little reasoning for their conclusions 
aside from citations to Hager and Higgins. In Hager, the Court granted Fannie Mae immunity 
from penalties under Nevada’s False Claims Act pursuant to the Anti-Penalty Provision.185 The 
entirety of the Court’s reasoning was provided in three sentences: 
“Congress also exempted the FHFA, when acting as conservator, from any penalties and 
                                                                
181  See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Horsley, Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-130 (Sept. 11, 2015); Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Phillips, Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-2217 (March 19, 2015); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Lorenus et 
al., Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 14-SP-1763 (Feb. 6, 2015); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Donahue et al., Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 14-
SP-3882 (March 25, 2015); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Key et al., Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-47 (May 22, 2015); Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Rangel et al., Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-3274 (Oct. 15, 2014); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Eaton, 
Boston Hsg. Ct. No. 14-SP-3994 (June 17, 2015); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Lavigne, 14-SP-3630 (March 30, 2015); Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Mejia, Chelsea Dist. Ct. No. 1414-SU-330 (Oct. 2, 2014). 
182  12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1), (4). 
183  12 U.S.C.A. § 4502(2). 
184  Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1218 (D. Nev. 
2011). 
185  Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F. Supp.2d 1211, 1218 (D. Nev. 
2011). 
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fines. Congress provided that the FHFA ‘shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of 
penalties and fines, including those arising from the failure of any person to pay any real property, 
personal property, probate, or recording tax or any recording or filing fees when due.’ As such, 
the Court finds that while under conservatorship with the FHFA, Fannie Mae is statutorily exempt 
from taxes, penalties, and fines to the same extent FHFA is.”186 
In Higgins, the Court similarly granted Fannie Mae immunity from penalties associated 
with a Kentucky recording statute.187 Although the Court provided more reasoning than the Court 
in Hager, its logic is entirely faulty. The Court explained that the prohibition against imposing 
penalties applies “‘in any case in which the Agency is acting as conservator or receiver.’”188 It 
then concluded that, “[w]hen the Agency is acting in that role, there is essentially no distinction 
between the Agency and Fannie Mae” because “when the Agency acts as conservator, it acts with 
complete control over Fannie Mae’s assets,” and thus, “[b]y prohibiting the imposition of fines 
and penalties on the Agency ‘in any case in which the Agency is acting as conservator or 
receiver,’ HERA necessarily prohibits the imposition of fines and penalties on Fannie Mae 
also.”189 
E. The Housing Courts’ Erroneous Interpretations of the Anti-Penalty Provision 
The Housing Courts’ rulings and their logic, as well as those of the precedents they cite, 
are erroneous and contrary to the plain language of HERA. The Anti-Penalty Provision of HERA 
explicitly confers immunity from liability for amounts in the nature of fines or penalties upon 
FHFA, not upon the Enterprises under its conservatorship. The first sub-section of the Anti-
Penalty Provision, titled “Applicability,” states: 
(1) Applicability: The provisions of this subsection shall apply with respect to the 
Agency in any case in which the Agency is acting as conservator or receiver. 
(4) Penalties and fines: The Agency shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of 
penalties or fines, including those arising from the failure of any person to pay any real property, 
personal property, probate, or recording tax or any recording or filing fees when due.190 
“Agency” is defined explicitly as FHFA.191 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are referred to 
under a separate defined term throughout the statute as “Enterprise.”192 The Enterprises’ argument 
in effect is that (a) during the conservatorship, (b) FHFA’s immunity to penalties, (c) applies to 
the Enterprises, for (d) all the Enterprises’ actions. If such were the case, Congress would have 
instead written 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j) as the following: 
Applicability: The provisions of this subsection shall apply with respect to the Agency 
and the Enterprises whenever the Enterprises are under conservatorship or receivership. 
                                                                
186  Id.,. at 1218, citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). 
187  Higgins, at *4, v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 12-CV-183, 2014 WL 1332825 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 
31, 2014), citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). 
188  Higgins, at *4, citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). 
189  Id. at 2,3. 
190  12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4) (emphasis added). 
191  12 U.S.C. § 4502(2) (“the term ‘Agency’ means the Federal Housing Finance Agency”).”).   
192  12 U.SC. § 4502(10) (“(2008) (“the term ‘Enterprise’ means the Federal National Mortgage Association 
[Fannie Mae] and any affiliate thereof, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation [Freddie Mac] and any affiliate 
thereof”).”). 
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Penalties and fines: Whenever the Enterprises are under conservatorship or receivership, 
the Agency and the Enterprises shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of penalties or 
fines, including those arising from the failure of any person to pay any real property, personal 
property, probate, or recording tax or any recording or filing fees when due. 
But Congress did not write the statute this way. No part of the statute limits the liability 
of the Enterprises for penalties; liability is only limited for FHFA. The Anti-Penalty Provision 
expressly applies “with respect to the Agency.” Based on this clause alone, the Anti-Penalty 
Provision applies only with respect to liability imposed on FHFA, and expressly does not apply 
where liability is imposed on Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
1. The Anti-Penalty Provision Does Not Apply in Chapter 93A Conditions Cases 
Because FHFA Does Not Act 
In addition to the clear Agency-only restriction, the plain language of the applicability 
section–– “shall apply with respect to the Agency in any case in which the Agency is acting as 
conservator” ––imposes two requirements for application of the Anti-Penalty Provision: (1) 
FHFA must “act,” and (2) that action must be in its capacity as conservator (or receiver).193 
Neither of the two conditions is met in these eviction cases. Specifically, Fannie Mae has 
admitted in sworn testimony that decisions regarding whether to repair defective conditions, and 
regarding property management more generally, are made by the Enterprises without any FHFA 
involvement.194 Fannie Mae also made clear in its testimony that FHFA has nothing to do with its 
rental unit or eviction process, and that FHFA, “do[es] not have direct control of the operations 
[of Fannie Mae].”195 
In order to satisfy the clear “Agency action” requirement of the statute, the argument that 
the Anti-Penalty Provision applies to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must therefore necessarily rest 
on the assumption that merely because the Enterprises are under conservatorship, all of their 
actions are equivalent to FHFA action. This assumption is false. HERA outlines FHFA’s powers 
to “operate the regulated entity.” This provision states that “[t]he Agency may, as conservator or 
receiver (i) take over the assets of and operate the regulated entity with all the powers of the 
shareholders, the directors, and the officers and conduct all business of the regulated entity; (ii) 
conduct all obligations and money due the regulated entity; (iii) perform all functions of the 
regulated entity in the name of the regulated entity which are consistent with the appointment as 
conservator or receiver; (iv) preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity; 
and (v) provide by contract for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, action, or duty of the 
                                                                
193  12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1) (2008) (“[t]he provisions of this subsection shall apply with respect to the 
Agency in any case in which the Agency is acting as conservator or receiver”) (emphasis added).  FHFA has not put the 
Enterprises under receivership, and therefore this Article will only address whether it met the requirement for acting in its 
capacity as conservator. 
194  See Transcript of Dep. of Fannie Mae (hereinafter “FNMA Tr.”) 231, 5-10, on file with author. Fed. Nat. 
Mortg. Ass’n v. Smith, N.E. Hsg. Ct. No. 13-SP-4346. (“Q. Does FHFA ever weigh in on the issues about what to repair 
[or] what not to repair? A. Oh. No. No. Q. Okay. So FHFA didn’t in this case then [?] A. No. FHFA wouldn’t. In that 
90,0000 example with Jake [referring to a previously discussed hypothetical example where a property needed $90,000 
worth of repairs], they would have no idea about that. They would never see that… FHFA wouldn’t be involved in any 
level of repair, really. They––those decisions are made well beneath them [FHFA]”). 
195  FNMA Tr. 398, 22; 56-57 (“Q. Are you aware of any FHFA directives concerning the rental unit in 
particular?... A. No, not really. Q. Are you aware of any directives related to the eviction process when the property’s in 
the eviction unit? A. No.”). 
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Agency as conservator or receiver.”196 The key word in this provision is “may,” which indicates 
that the conservator is permitted to take the enumerated actions, but is not obligated to do so, 
which would instead be indicated by the word “shall.”197 
The language and meaning of § 4617(b)(2)(B) are critical because FHFA in fact has 
chosen not to invoke the full extent of the authority available for operation of the Enterprises. 
While FHFA at first availed itself of the full authority allowed under § 4617(b)(2)(B) when it 
established the conservatorship in September 2008, it shortly thereafter, in November 2008, re-
delegated much of this authority to the Enterprises. With this re-delegation, FHFA explicitly 
chose “for the Enterprises to ‘continue to be responsible for normal business activities and day-to-
day operations’” and “not to manage every aspect of the Enterprises’ operations.”198, 199 FHFA 
retained its authority as conservator only over “selected business decisions.”200 For these business 
decisions, FHFA controls the Enterprises’ conduct either by issuing directives or requiring 
Enterprise approval for policy changes.201 This operational structure has been affirmed by Fannie 
Mae in sworn testimony.202 When asked about FHFA’s involvement in repairing defective 
conditions and other matters related to managing tenant-occupied properties, Fannie Mae 
responded: “I think you have the role of FHFA wrong, maybe. I mean, they have oversight of 
Fannie Mae––but not direct control of the operationsFalse So yeah, the questions relative to them 
would always be answered with a––you know, wouldn’t have been involved at that level. . . those 
decisions are made well beneath them.”203 
FHFA’s issuance of “directives” to the Enterprises and its requirements that the 
Enterprises obtain approval for select business decisions also reflect the fact that the Enterprises 
                                                                
196  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B) (2008).   
197  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 558 (2014) (“the word ‘may’ in a statute is 
generally permissive, reflecting the Legislature’s intent to grant discretion or permission to make a finding or authorize an 
act”); see also School Comm’n of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass’n, 385 Mass. 79, 81 (1982) (“the word ‘may’ does 
not impose a mandate but simply authorizes an act”).   
198  FHFA’s Conservator Approval Process for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Business Decisions 
(“Conservator Approval Process”), FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN. (Sept. 27, 2012), 
fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2012-008_2.pdf. [https://perma.cc/KSM8-NZZT]. 
199  Enterprise actions fall under the scope of conservator review only by three prescribed methods. Id.  First, 
the Enterprises are required to submit for approval certain proposed actions involving “critical matters.” Id. “Critical 
matters” fall into eight general categories, termed “non-delegated authorities, ” which include actions involving capital 
stock, actions related to the creation of any subsidiary or affiliate, and settlements involving over $50 million. Id. at 5-7.  
Second, FHFA may unilaterally elect to review an Enterprise action. Id. at 7.  Finally, an Enterprise may independently 
choose to submit for review or consultation an activity even if it falls outside the mandatory eight areas requiring approval. 
Id.  The Conservatorship Reports make clear that if an Enterprise activity does not reach FHFA by one of these three 
methods, FHFA has not exercised any power or function as conservator. See id. 
200  Conservator Approval Process, supra note 206, at 5; see also White Paper: FHFA-OIG’s Current 
Assessment of FHFA’s Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (“Current Assessment of Conservatorship”), 
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/WPR-2012-
001.pdf. [https://perma.cc/EE3B-TJLA]. 
201  See id. 
202  FNMA Tr. 56 (“A. Well, we answer to FHFA in DC, but that would be through our DC group. But if 
they gave, you know, directives to the DC group management, then, if that affected REO, some of those directives -- 
which it could -- then they would flow down to us, I'm sure.”). 
203  FNMA Tr. 398, 18-22; 399, 3-9.   
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operate independently most of the time.204 Were FHFA in fact availing itself of the full authority 
allowed under § 4617(b)(2)(B), i.e. “perform[ing] all functions of the regulated entity” and 
“operat[ing] the entity with all the powers of the shareholders, directors, and the officers,” there 
would be no need for directives because FHFA would already be fully controlling the operations 
of the companies. Likewise, no review or approval process would be necessary.205 Indeed, 
however, those processes are necessary to the conservatorship because FHFA is not exercising its 
full § 4617(b)(2)(B) authority and operating the Enterprises. 
Thus, because FHFA has not invoked the full authority, there is no basis to presume that 
actions taken by the Enterprises are equivalent to or reflect FHFA action. The cases that the 
Courts rely on––Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F.Supp.2d 
1211 (D. Nev. 2011) and Higgins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2014 WL 1332825 (E.D. 
Ky. 2014)––are based on faulty understandings of § 4617(b)(2)(B) and make the wrongful 
presumptions described above. The Courts in those cases ignore the word “may” and presume that 
because the provision authorizes FHFA as conservator to undertake the enumerated actions to 
operate the Enterprises, FHFA has in fact availed itself of that authority and is undertaking all 
operations. In Nevada ex rel. Hager, the Court omits the word “may” in its citation to the statute 
and instead improperly links the enumerated operational powers of § 4617(b)(2)(B) to the word 
“shall” used in the previous provision of the statute, suggesting that FHFA is required to 
undertake, and therefore has undertaken, all operational authority.206 This misconstruing of the 
statutory language blinds courts to an appropriate factual analysis of the extent to which FHFA 
has actually invoked its operational powers, and instead allows it to leap directly to its conclusion 
that “while under conservatorship with the FHFA, Fannie Mae is statutorily exempt from taxes, 
penalties, and fines to the same extent that FHFA is.”207 The only logical way in which courts 
could reach this conclusion is by assuming that FHFA is fully operating the Enterprises, which, of 
course, after the November 2008 re-delegation, is false. 
The Higgins court likewise makes an illogical leap from the assertion that “when the 
Agency acts as conservator, it acts with complete control over Fannie Mae’s assets,” to the 
conclusion that, “[b]y prohibiting the imposition of fines and penalties on the Agency ‘in any case 
in which the Agency is acting as a conservator or a receiver,’ HERA necessarily prohibits the 
imposition of fines and penalties on Fannie Mae also.”208 This conclusion is illogical because it 
presumes that the Agency is always acting as conservator, and therefore is always controlling 
Fannie Mae’s assets (i.e. Fannie Mae’s every move). This presumption is false. FHFA clearly 
                                                                
204  Some examples of recent FHFA directives to the Enterprises are to not acquire mortgages on properties 
encumbered with PACE liens and to allow fair market value buybacks of Real Estate Owned properties to former 
mortgagors. Fannie Mae attested at its deposition that the nonprofit buyback “directive” is the only “directive” of which it 
is aware that affects Real Estate Owned properties. See FNMA Tr. 56-57.  
205  The entire concept of “conservatorship approval” would be nonsensical if all Enterprise action were 
equivalent to Enterprise action.  Indeed, FHFA’s own statements and reports indicate that it distinguishes between FHFA, 
as conservator, decisions to approve a given action and Enterprise actions taken independently.  For example, FHFA-OIG 
determined that Fannie Mae “executed seven insurance settlements totaling over $306 million that should have been 
approved by FHFA in advance. See FHFA-OIG” Conservator Approval Process,.supra note 206, at 2.  The report 
reprimanded Fannie Mae for not seeking approval. Id.  Such reprimand would be nonsensical and unnecessary if all 
Fannie Mae actions were FHFA actions.   
206  Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 812 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1218 (D. Nev. 
2011). 
207  Nevada ex rel. Hager, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.   
208  Id. at *3 
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does not control Fannie Mae’s every move.209 FHFA exerts its authority as conservator at distinct 
moments––by issuing a directive or approving a practice or policy––while Fannie Mae controls 
its own assets and operations most of the time. FHFA has not assumed complete operational 
powers as conservator, nor does § 4617(b)(2)(B) require it to do so.210 
2. The Anti-Penalty Provision Does Not Apply in Chapter 93A Conditions Cases 
Because FHFA Does Not Act in its Capacity as Conservator 
FHFA also fails to meet the second requirement for applicability of the Anti-Penalty 
Provision, as no action was taken in FHFA’s capacity as conservator.211 HERA expressly defines 
what actions may qualify as actions taken as “conservator.” Section 4617(b)(2)(B) outlines 
FHFA’s “powers as conservator” as follows: “[t]he agency may, as conservator, take such action 
as may be––(i) necessary to put the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) 
appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and conserve the assets 
and property of the regulated entity” (emphasis added).212 Thus, in order for the second 
requirement of the Anti-Penalty Provision to be met, there must not only be action by FHFA, but 
that action must also be both (i) necessary to put the enterprises in a sound and solvent condition, 
and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the enterprises and preserve and conserve their 
assets. 
Thus, even if FHFA has taken some action regarding tenants’ poor property conditions, 
Courts would then be required to ask whether that action was within the scope of the powers of 
the conservatorship, i.e., whether the failure to repair the defective was both (1) necessary to put 
FHFA in a sound and solvent condition and (2) appropriate to carry on the business of FHFA and 
preserve and conserve its assets. And indeed, one would be hard pressed to put forth any logical 
analysis that would lead to affirmative answers to these questions, as failure to repair defective 
conditions at a property erodes, rather than preserves and conserves, the value of real property. It 
is likewise difficult to imagine how foregoing needed repairs at individual properties, likely 
totaling somewhere in the tens of thousands of dollars, would be “necessary” to put Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac––multi-billion dollar entities––in a sound and solvent condition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The non-profit buyback and Chapter 93A multiple damages litigation represent attempts 
by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA to afford immunities to the Enterprises that were clearly 
never intended to extend to them. These attempts have been successful largely because of the 
Courts’ lack of understanding of the conservatorship structure. The Courts, through Fannie Mae, 
                                                                
209 See FNMA Tr. 398, 18-22 (“[FHFA has] oversight of Fannie Mae… but not direct control of the 
operations.”).   
210 The Higgins Court also assumes that Fannie Mae liability is FHFA liability, and therefore that FHFA 
immunity is Fannie Mae immunity. See Higgins, 2014 WL 1332825 (E.D. Ky. 2014). But this assumption is also false: if 
Congress had intended that FHFA’s immunities would always extend to Fannie Mae, the statute would have said that the 
Enterprises are immune from penalties.  Since the statute only says that FHFA is immune, it is only applicable in 
situations where FHFA would actually be liable for penalties awarded against Fannie Mae. 
211 See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1) (2008) (“shall apply with respect to the Agency in any case in which the 
Agency is acting as conservator”). 
212  Id. 
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Freddie Mac, and FHFA’s urging, have collapsed key distinctions between FHFA regulator 
action, FHFA conservatorship action, and action taken by the Enterprises. These distinctions are 
supported by Circuit Court precedent, formal documents issued by FHFA, and sworn testimony, 
as well as by the plain language of HERA. The Courts’ blurring reflects a muddied interpretation 
of the statute and a superficial analysis of the FHFA conservatorship structure as enacted. 
While FHFA chose parts of the conservatorship structure, (it could have, for instance, 
never re-delegated control to the Enterprises), it appears to have done so with the intention of 
having the best of all worlds. On the one hand, FHFA has deflected the enormous responsibilities 
of running the day-to-day operations of the trillion-dollar Enterprises, reserving for itself only the 
more limited role of overseeing critical initiatives and operations. Yet on the other hand, it seeks 
to afford those day-to-day operations and decisions the same level of insulation permitted where 
FHFA undertakes a conservator action. Nothing in the text or purpose of HERA supports such a 
far-ranging grant of immunity. 
By succeeding in extending these immunities, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA are 
quietly undermining state laws intended to protect low-income tenants and homeowners, and are 
creating precedent that will allow them to continue to do so. In the nonprofit buyback litigation, 
the Enterprises and FHFA obtained permission to violate a state law intended to prevent 
displacement and restore homeownership among low- and middle-income families who had been 
hard-hit by the foreclosure crisis. Through their inaccurate portrayal of the conservatorship 
structure, they succeeded in setting precedent that allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to flout 
consumer protection laws and obtain immunity whenever FHFA post-hoc jumps to their defense. 
In the Chapter 93A litigation, Fannie Mae succeeded in insulating the Enterprises from statutory 
multiple damages that are among the most powerful tenant protections against violations of the 
state sanitary code. Under this precedent, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are shielded from all 
penalties imposed under state consumer protection law––penalties which are typically imposed to 
deter conduct the Legislature deems particularly egregious. 
Not only are these Courts’ decisions reflective of an erroneous interpretation of HERA, 
but their result is all the more ironic given that they harm the very same low-income tenants and 
homeowners that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are mission-bound to protect and support. The 
Enterprises have an express statutory mission of preserving and improving housing affordability 
for low- and middle-income families.213 This mission was reiterated with the passage of HERA 
and its creation of the Housing Trust Fund, which was established with the goal of increasing 
rentals and homeownership for extremely low- and very low-income families.214 Since the 
passage of HERA, FHFA has frequently referred to and invoked the Enterprises’ affordable 
housing mission in press releases and statements to the public.215 In early 2015, FHFA even 
adopted a final rule establishing a goal for the Enterprises’ creation of affordable rental 
housing.216 
                                                                
213  See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.  
214  See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4568(a)(1) - (c)(3) (2008).  HERA obligates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to “set 
aside an amount equal to 4.2 basis points for each dollar of the unpaid principal balance of its total new business 
purchases” to support affordable housing initiatives. 12 U.S.C. § 4567(a)(1)(A) (2008).  According to observers, when 
HERA was passed it was “understood” that this set-aside would generate $500 million each year for these initiatives. See 
Reiss, “Overview” supra note 5 at 485.  However, the FHFA suspended all payments upon the establishment of the 
conservatorship, and no funds have ever been deposited into the Housing Trust Fund. Id. 
215  See, e.g., Melvin L. Watt, Director of FHFA, Remarks at the Bipartisan Policy Center (Feb. 18, 2016) in 
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, Feb. 2016. 
216  FHFA Adopts Final Rule on 2015-2017 Housing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. 
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It is now time for the Courts and the public to hold Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA 
accountable to this public mission. Doing so will require a rigorous interpretation of HERA that 
ensures the extraordinary judicial immunities granted by the statute are applied only as properly 
allowed under the statute’s language and history. It will also require courts to attend carefully to 
the complex conservatorship structure to discern where and when FHFA is “acting as 
conservator.” The litigation in Massachusetts reveals that as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac extend 
their roles outside of the secondary mortgage market and into the domain of landlord and property 
owner, proper interpretation of HERA is crucial to protecting low- and middle-income housing 
throughout the United States. 
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